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Article

Originalism and Political Ignorance
Ilya Somin

†

INTRODUCTION
Original meaning originalism may now be the most popular version of constitutional theory in the legal academy. It has
been endorsed by well-known conservative scholars such as
Robert Bork, John McGinnis, Michael Stokes Paulsen, and Ste1
ven Calabresi, libertarians such as Randy Barnett, Gary Law-

† Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful
suggestions and comments, I would like to thank Jack Balkin, David Bernstein, Michelle Boardman, Steve Calabresi, T.J. Chiang, Jamal Greene, Bruce
Johnsen, John McGinnis, Michael Rappaport, David Schleicher, Mark
Tushnet, the editors of the Minnesota Law Review, and participants in the
University of San Diego annual Originalism Works in Progress conference,
and the George Mason University School of Law Levy workshop. I would also
like to thank Chaim Mandelbaum and Ryan Facer for helpful research assistance. Copyright © 2012 by Ilya Somin.
1. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990); Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF
DEBATE 1, 12, 35 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) [hereinafter Calabresi, Introduction] (arguing that constitutional interpretation should be based on “the
original meaning of the constitutional text”); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T.
Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011);
Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 664, 701 (2009); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1141–45 (2003); John O. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 791
(2002) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution]; Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 991, 991 (2008) (“There is only one correct way to interpret
the Constitution, and that is original public meaning textualism.”). McGinnis
and Rappaport have more recently advanced the theory of “original methods
originalism.” John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism]. However, I treat this is as a variant of “original meaning.” See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
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2

son, and Michael Rappaport, prominent left of center academ3
ics such as Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, and James Ryan, and
4
other leading scholars such as Larry Solum. It is also advocated by well-known originalist jurists such as Antonin Scalia and
5
Clarence Thomas.
Some leading scholars still reject original meaning
6
originalism and continue to criticize the theory forcefully. And
7
a few originalists still adhere to the original intent school. But

2. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING
THE LOST CONSTITUTION]; Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists]; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism
as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) (arguing that the
Constitution should be interpreted as understood by the “reasonable American” in 1788, the time of ratification); McGinnis & Rappaport, Our
Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 1, at 802–05.
3. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6–7 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28–29 (2000); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293 (2007) [hereinafter
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning]; Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter
Balkin, Original Meaning]; James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution:
The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1524 (2011). Ryan describes the theory he and others endorse as “textualism.” But it is clear from
the context that the version of textualism he has in mind is based on the original public meaning of the text. He refers to “original meaning” as the newly
dominant view in constitutional theory. Id. at 1524 –26.
4. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 1–2 (Ill. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory, Research Papers Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
5. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3075 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that we should return to the “original meaning” of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, defined as “what the public most
likely thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean” at the time of enactment); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
857 (1989).
6. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 7–31 (2010);
Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009);
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714
(2011); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the
Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 583 (2011).
7. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (1999); Larry
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You're Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967,
974 –77 (2004).
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there is little doubt that original meaning has attracted widespread support in recent years.
In contrast to original intent, which focuses on the personal intentions of the Framers, original meaning is usually interpreted as depending on the public understanding of the meaning of a constitutional provision at the time of ratification.
Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, describes the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as “what the
public most likely thought the Privileges or Immunities Clause
8
to mean” when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.
Many other leading originalists define the concept in similar
9
terms.
This understanding of original meaning makes it important to determine what the public actually knew and understood about the meaning of specific parts of the Constitution at
the time they were enacted. If most voters knew little or nothing about the constitutional provision in question, it may be difficult or impossible to determine its original meaning. At the
very least, the original meaning might turn out to be very imprecise, especially in cases where the text is ambiguous enough
to admit more than one plausible interpretation.
Survey data showing extensive public ignorance on even
very basic political issues suggests that cases where the public
has little knowledge of ambiguous parts of the Constitution at
10
the time of ratification might well be common. Yet none of the
rapidly growing literature on original meaning has so far grap8. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3075 (Thomas, J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 1, at 144 (defining original meaning as
“what the public of that time would have understood the words to mean”);
Amar, supra note 3, at 29 (“What counts as text is the document as understood
by the American People who ratified and amended it, and what counts as history is accessible public meaning, not secret private intent.”); see also Barnett,
An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 2, at 620–21 (same).
10. See, e.g., SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 10–14 (2003) (summarizing evidence of extensive voter ignorance); MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW
ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104 (1996) (same); RICK
SHENKMAN, JUST HOW STUPID ARE WE? FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
AMERICAN VOTER 13–36 (2008) (same); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of
Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304 –29 (2004) (same); Ilya
Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 416–
19 (1998) [hereinafter Somin, Voter Ignorance] (same). For an extensive recent
review, see ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at ch. 1) (on file with author) [hereinafter SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE].
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pled with the reality of widespread public ignorance and its implications for originalism.
In this Article, I begin the task of filling the gap in the literature. Part I describes the ways in which various theories of
original meaning implicitly depend on assumptions about public knowledge. As a result, original meaning originalists must
take account of the problem of political ignorance. This is fairly
obvious in the case of theories that explicitly define original
11
meaning as the understanding held by the public at the time.
But it also applies, in somewhat different form, to more complex variants of originalism, such as John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s “original methods originalism,” which argues
that provisions of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the methodology expected at the time of enact12
ment. It is similarly relevant to Bruce Ackerman’s quasioriginalist theory of “constitutional moments,” under which the
relevant original meaning is determined during periods of constitutional change that may not always involve formal constitu13
tional amendments.
Political ignorance even turns out to be a potential problem
for theories that base original meaning on the perspective of a
14
hypothetical well-informed observer. Although political ignorance is a less significant problem for original intent theories, it
does create a challenge for Keith Whittington’s more populist
approach to original intent, under which the relevant intent is
15
that of the people rather than a small group of framers.
Political ignorance also has implications for the theories of
those scholars and jurists who believe that original meaning
should be one of several factors in constitutional interpretation,
16
even if not the only one. To the extent that the original mean11. See sources cited supra note 9.
12. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note
1, at 751–52.
13. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 285–88
(1991) (outlining his theory).
14. See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 2, at 72–73 (theory based on
a hypothetical well-informed observer); see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra
note 1, at 1144 (same).
15. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 110–59.
16. Even Supreme Court Justices who are not consistent originalists have
sometimes used originalist arguments to justify their positions. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 641–70 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 101–16 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Some nonoriginalist legal scholars also recognize that originalist
arguments have at least a limited role to play in constitutional interpretation.
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ing is a factor in their theories of constitutional interpretation,
partial originalists will still have to consider the problem of political ignorance.
In all of these cases, original meaning may be difficult or
impossible to determine if voters at the time of ratification
lacked adequate knowledge, which may not have been an unusual state of affairs. The problem is most severe with respect to
determining the original meaning of provisions that are relatively vague and open-ended and least so when it comes to
17
those that are relatively clear and precise. However, many of
the most important disputes in constitutional law involve the
former. The problem of political ignorance is also likely to be
more acute with regard to issues that were not a major focus of
public debate at the time of enactment.
Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence on current
political ignorance suggests that the public may well have been
poorly informed about many constitutional issues at the time of
ratification. Indeed, acquiring little or no political knowledge is
actually rational behavior for most voters.
In Part II, I consider several possible solutions to the challenge posed by political ignorance. These include relying on the
perceptions of political elites, looking to contemporary coverage
of constitutional issues in the popular media, and assuming
that the public divined an original meaning after all by relying
on “information shortcuts.”
Each of these approaches has some merit. But all of them
also have important shortcomings. Ultimately, originalists may
have to rely on a hybrid combination of all these methods to
meet the challenge of political ignorance. Even so, there will be
cases where the problem of political ignorance makes original
meaning nearly impossible to divine. To address such situations, original meaning originalism may have to be supplemented by other interpretative methodologies.

See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 11–13 (1980) (admitting that “interpretivist” originalism has some
value and may be useful in interpreting some parts of the Constitution); Larry
Kramer, Panel on Originalism and Pragmatism, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTERCENTURY OF DEBATE, supra note 1, at 158 (criticizing original meaning
originalism, but noting that “[i]t does not follow that originalism is irrelevant.
To solve a given problem, I am still going to want to start with the original design. . . . [T]he sensible way to think about constitutional interpretation is to
begin with the original understanding.”).
17. See discussion infra Part I.D.1.

630

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:625

Part III briefly considers two ways in which originalists
could respond to the challenge of political ignorance by modifying their theories: adopting a presumption in favor of literal
over figurative interpretations of constitutional text, and leaving more issues to be resolved by construction rather than interpretation. These strategies address the problem of political
ignorance by modifying originalist theory itself, rather than by
trying to work within its existing confines.
This Article does not lay out a comprehensive theory of
originalism or even a comprehensive statement of the ways in
which originalists should deal with the problem of political ignorance. It does, however, begin the conversation about this
important but so far neglected problem.
I do not believe that the issue of political ignorance is a fatal flaw of originalism. Indeed, I remain sympathetic to
originalist theories of constitutional interpretation generally,
and original meaning originalism in particular. However, political ignorance does pose challenges to originalism that deserve
greater attention from critics and defenders of the theory alike.
I. ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE CHALLENGE OF
POLITICAL IGNORANCE
Theories of original meaning rely on implicit assumptions
about public knowledge of various constitutional provisions at
the time of enactment. These assumptions are at least partially
undermined if the majority of the public is in fact ignorant
about the issue in question. Unfortunately, the available data
on political knowledge suggests that such ignorance may well
have been common. Widespread political ignorance also has
important implications for at least some versions of original intent theories. It has similar ramifications for nonoriginalist
theories of interpretation that appeal to original meaning as
one of several relevant factors in determining the meaning of
the Constitution.
A. ASSUMPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THEORIES OF ORIGINAL
MEANING
Theories of original meaning are based on implicit assumptions of public knowledge about relevant constitutional provisions. This is most obvious in relatively simple formulations of
theory, which interpret original meaning in terms of “what the
public of that time would have understood the words to mean,”
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18

as Robert Bork puts it. Many other prominent originalists
have endorsed similar formulations, including Akhil Amar,
19
Justice Clarence Thomas, and Randy Barnett. They view original meaning as what the public at the time of enactment believed the meaning to be.
This version of originalism long predates the recent debate
between advocates of original meaning and original intent.
James Madison endorsed a similar view, arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with “the sense in
20
which [it] was accepted and ratified by the nation,” which he
earlier described more precisely as “the sense attached to it by
the people in their respective State Conventions where it recd.
21
[sic] all the authority which it possesses.”
Political ignorance may be less of an obstacle for theories of
original meaning that do not focus primarily on the understanding of the general public at the time. But as we shall see,
they do not avoid the problem entirely.
1. Knowledge Prerequisites of Original Meaning Theories that
Rely on the Actual Understanding of the Public
This approach implicitly assumes several elements of
knowledge on the part of the public at the time of ratification.
First, it implies that the public knows that the relevant constitutional provision has been enacted, or at least is under consideration. A person who does not know about the Fourteenth
Amendment is unlikely to have an opinion about its meaning.
Second, it assumes that the public knows that the relevant provision applies to whatever issue happens to be under consideration by the observer seeking to determine the original meaning—for example, that the Equal Protection Clause of the
22
Fourteenth Amendment is relevant to sex discrimination.
In addition, the public must have some knowledge or understanding of how that particular issue would be resolved under the Amendment. In the case of sex discrimination, they
would need to have some understanding of what kind of sex
18. BORK, supra note 1, at 144.
19. See sources cited supra notes 2–5.
20. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 99
(quoting Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191–92 (G. Hunt ed., 1910)).
21. Id. at 98 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie
(Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 447–48 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937)).
22. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, passim (considering this issue).
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discrimination is forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause, if
any.
The second and third requirements might to some extent
be obviated by those versions of originalism that hold that the
original meaning consists only of general principles or “seman23
tic” meanings rather than “originally expected applications.”
For example, Jack Balkin argues that originalism requires fidelity only to the “semantic meaning” of the words of the constitutional text, defined as “the concepts that the words . . . re24
ferred to at the time the clause was originally enacted.” Thus,
the Equal Protection Clause may refer to a general “anticaste”
principle that forbids caste-like classifications regardless of
whether the public at the time of enactment actually believed
that sex discrimination was an example of the kind of discrimi25
nation forbidden by that principle. Professor Balkin himself
argues that the Clause embodies a principle that bars “class
26
legislation” as well as “caste legislation.”
However, this reformulation reduces the relevant
knowledge requirements only modestly. The public is still implicitly assumed to understand what the relevant general principle is and what criteria are used to determine whether a par27
ticular case falls under the principle or not. In the case of sex
discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause, the public
would have to have known that the Clause adopts the anticaste principle and have some idea of what counts as a castelike legal distinction. Even if the public may not realize whether gender discrimination specifically is banned, the original
public meaning surely includes some general sense of the criteria by which we would go about answering such a question.
Depending on the situation, understanding a general principle may require as much, or greater, knowledge as understanding specific applications of a rule. Principles such as due
process, nondiscrimination, and the anticaste principle have
numerous complexities that have led to intense disagreements
23. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 13; Calabresi,
Introduction, supra note 1, at 35; Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, at 42.
24. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 13. For a recent critique of Balkin’s emphasis on “abstract” general principles, see John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 737. For Professor Balkin’s response, see Jack M. Balkin, Nine
Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 822–29.
25. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, at 20–27, 46–51.
26. Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 450.
27. See id. at 452–53.
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28

about their nature and scope even among experts. Shifting the
focus from applications to principles reduces the need for public
knowledge of specific cases, but increases the need for philosophical understanding of general principles.
Some of the advocates of the public understanding theory
modify it by suggesting that they are actually looking for the
understanding of the “reasonable person” at the time. These in29
clude Randy Barnett and Justice Antonin Scalia. This would
narrow the inquiry to the views of those members of the public
who are “reasonable.” However, a person can be reasonable
without necessarily having much knowledge of law and politics.
Therefore, the reasonable observer is not necessarily knowledgeable unless being well-informed is built into the definition
of what counts as reasonable. I address the latter approach lat30
er in the Article.
The reasonable person might also be conceptualized as a
hypothetical construct rather than any actually existing mem31
ber of the public. But if this hypothetical individual is not assumed to be knowledgeable by definition, he or she presumably
would have knowledge limitations similar to those of actual
members of the public at the time. Therefore public ignorance
would still be a problem for a theory of original meaning that
relies on the views of this type of hypothetical observer.
The knowledge implications of this kind of originalism also
apply to Professor Bruce Ackerman’s famous “constitutional
moments” theory, under which constitutional change can be legitimately implemented outside the Article V Amendment pro32
cess if it attracts sufficiently broad popular and elite support.
28. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER chs. 3–6
(2011) (describing the long history of expert disagreement over the meaning of
“due process”); Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, at 20–27, 46–66 (discussing
the complexity of the anticaste principle); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2413–28 (1994) (describing three different
understandings of the anticaste principle).
29. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2,
at 92 (“‘[O]riginal meaning’ originalism seeks the public or objective meaning
that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional
provision at the time of enactment.”); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 5,
at 17 (arguing that original meaning is “the intent that a reasonable person
would gather from the text of the law”); see also Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, supra note 2, at 621.
30. See discussion infra Part I.A.3.
31. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1162.
32. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 53–56; 2 BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 414 –16 (1998) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Poli-
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Ackerman’s theory is a sort of originalism, insofar as it urges
courts to interpret the Constitution on the basis of meanings
33
established during past periods of constitutional change. The
difference between Ackerman and traditional originalists is
that, for him, the relevant periods where original meaning
should be found are not exclusively those where the Constitution has been altered through the formal amendment process.
Ackermanian constitutional moments can occur at other times
34
as well.
Ackerman contends that, during “constitutional moments,”
the public pays heightened attention to constitutional issues
and the resulting changes to the constitutional system are ones
35
endorsed by majority public opinion —unlike policies adopted
during periods of “normal politics,” when he recognizes most
36
voters pay little attention. Thus, Ackerman’s theory relies
crucially on the claim that the general public understood and
endorsed the constitutional changes enacted during constitu37
tional moments.
2. Knowledge Prerequisites of Original Methods Originalism
Leading originalist scholars John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport have proposed an alternative approach to original
38
meaning, which they call “original methods originalism.” Instead of relying on original public meaning directly, they argue
that constitutional interpreters should use the “interpretive
methods that the constitutional enactors would have deemed
39
applicable to it” at the time of enactment.
tics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 489–90 (1989) (discussing several
examples of what could be considered “constitutional moments”).
33. Cf. Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and Mobilizable History, 65
MD. L. REV. 171, 178 n.17 (2006) (describing Ackerman as a “multiple
originalist” because he recognizes several different historical periods as
sources of original meaning); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 932 (2009) (noting that “Ackerman's theory seemed to require an account of original meaning”).
34. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 32, at pt. III (describing the New Deal “constitutional moment” of the 1930s, when no formal
amendments occurred).
35. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 285–88.
36. Id. at 272.
37. I discuss the knowledge implications of Ackerman’s theory in greater
detail in Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: Assessing
the New Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595 (2003).
38. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 1,
passim.
39. Id. at 751.
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This theory can be seen as a variant on original public
meaning, with the focus on the public’s original understanding
of interpretive methodology rather than their understanding of
substantive rules. Like more traditional versions of original
meaning originalism, the original methods approach focuses on
public understanding at the time of enactment and ratifica40
tion. McGinnis and Rappaport themselves argue that their
theory is an alternative to original public meaning originalism
41
rather than a subvariant of it. For my purposes, nothing turns
on the distinction between these two descriptions of their theory. Even if it is not actually a form of original meaning
originalism, original methods originalism has much in common
with it.
Original methods originalism shifts the knowledge burden
from understanding of the substantive requirements of specific
parts of the Constitution to knowledge of the rules by which
those provisions are likely to be interpreted. The theory seems
to assume that the enacting public had relevant knowledge of
the interpretive rules that were expected to control future interpretations of the constitutional provisions they had just
adopted.
Under this approach, the public would have knowledge of
the relevant interpretive rules that they expect to be used to interpret a given constitutional provision. For example, the public would know whether the Fourteenth Amendment is ex42
pected to be interpreted using textualism,
originalist
methodologies, “living Constitution” theories, pragmatic theo43
ries of interpretation, or perhaps other options. The voters
need not have an understanding of the full range of alternatives. But they presumably do need to know which methodology
is actually expected to be used to interpret the provision they
have enacted and how it works. Otherwise, they cannot really
be said to have “decided whether to vote for the Constitution

40. Id. at 751–52.
41. Id. at 761–65.
42. For a discussion of the difference between textualism and originalism,
see Ilya Somin, “Active Liberty” and Judicial Power: What Should Courts Do to
Promote Democracy?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1851–53 (2006) (reviewing
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)).
43. For a defense of judicial pragmatism, see, for example, RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003).
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based on the meaning it would have had under the original in44
terpretive rules.”
It is possible to interpret McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory
as requiring only legal experts to have such knowledge, with
the views of the general public largely irrelevant. McGinnis and
Rappaport themselves suggest the possibility that the public
might deliberately defer to the superior expertise of legal experts in determining what methods to use in interpreting a
45
constitutional provision. But they also emphasize that a key
advantage of the original methods approach is that it uses
those rules that were adopted in a supermajority process by the
enactors: “The enactors would have decided whether to vote for
the Constitution based on the meaning it would have had under the original interpretive rules . . . . Severing the Constitution’s meaning from these rules gives effect to a different Con46
stitution than the one originally enacted.” They contend that a
constitutional rule enacted by a supermajority process is more
likely to be beneficial than one developed by other means, such
47
as later judicial decision-making.
These benefits of
supermajoritarianism seem to depend at least in part on the
members of the supermajority understanding the interpretive
methods they are voting for.
3. Theories That Base Original Meaning on the Views of
Hypothetical Well-Informed Observers
Some theories of original meaning emphasize the views of
hypothetical well-informed observers rather than the actual beliefs of the public at the time of ratification. For example, Michael Paulsen and Vasan Kesavan contend that original meaning should be interpreted in light of the perceptions of an
“ordinary, reasonably well-informed user of the language” at
48
the time of enactment. Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman rely
44. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 1,
at 782 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 765. I discuss the implications of this idea in more detail infra
Part I.D.3.
46. McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 1,
at 782–83 (citation omitted).
47. Id.; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic
Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 388–89 (2007) (discussing the
benefits of the supermajoritarian enactment of the original Constitution);
McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 1, at
785–90 (discussing the reasons for a supermajority requirement to amend the
Constitution).
48. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1144.
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on an even better-informed hypothetical “reasonable person,”
whom they describe as “conversant with legal traditions and
conventions of the time” as well as “highly intelligent and educated and capable of making and recognizing subtle connections
49
and inferences.” The Lawson-Seidman hypothetical arbiter of
original meaning is, as they put it, “a formidable intellectual
50
figure.”
At first glance, it seems as if hypothetical observer theories
of original meaning can avoid the problem of political ignorance
altogether, simply by defining it away. Their hypothetical “reasonable” person is well-informed by definition.
The hypothetical observer version of originalism is indeed
less vulnerable to the challenge of political ignorance than other approaches. But it does not avoid the problem entirely.
Widespread political ignorance still creates significant difficulties even for this version of original meaning originalism.
Advocates of the hypothetical observer theory implicitly assume that the well-informed reasonable observer is simply an
ordinary member of the public with the addition of greater
knowledge and intelligence. However, much research shows
that increases in knowledge significantly alter attitudes towards political issues. Survey respondents with high levels of
political knowledge have very different views from those of the
general population on a variety of political issues, even after
controlling for numerous demographic and political variables,
51
such as race, gender, income, age, and partisan identification.
Thus, the increased knowledge of the hypothetical observer
is also likely to affect his or her political attitudes, which in
turn could easily influence their interpretations of ambiguous
parts of the Constitution. We know that political ideology influ52
ences constitutional interpretation by judges, and it is likely
to do so among lay observers as well. To understand how the
hypothetical well-informed observer is likely to interpret the
Constitution, we need to consider the impact that increased political knowledge may have on his views.
49. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 2, at 73.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., ALTHAUS, supra note 10, at pt. III; BRYAN CAPLAN, MYTH OF
THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 50–93
(2007); DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 10, at 218–67, 334–36.
52. For a summary of the relevant evidence, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (rev. ed. 2003).
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Advocates of the hypothetical observer theory can try to ignore this issue. They can model the hypothetical reasonable
person as simply an individual with heightened political and
legal knowledge whose normative views remain completely unchanged. But this move increases the extent to which the hypothetical observer is distanced from the general public whose
understanding he or she is supposed to be a stand-in for.
If the hypothetical observer is vastly more informed than
the actual public at the time of ratification, using the former as
a proxy for the latter risks undercutting many of the claimed
advantages of original meaning originalism. For example, some
scholars contend that originalist interpretations of the Constitution are superior to the alternatives because the original
meaning of a constitutional provision is the one that was enact53
ed by a supermajoritarian political process, or at least embod54
ies “popular sovereignty.” But if there is a great difference between the views of the knowledgeable hypothetical observer
and those of the general public that ratified the relevant part of
the Constitution in the real world, then the interpretation endorsed by the former is probably not the one that succeeded in
getting supermajority political support. Nor is it a product of
popular sovereignty. Perhaps only a tiny fraction of the general
public actually held the same views as the hypothetical observer, or even was aware that such an interpretation was a logical
possibility.
Other scholars defend original meaning originalism on the
ground that it provides a binding framework for government
55
that can extend across time, or that it “locks in” important
features of the Constitution against change adopted by means
56
other than the amendment process. It is not clear, however,
why we would want to adopt a framework that reflects the
views of a purely hypothetical observer, or lock in her hypothetical preferences if they have little or no connection to the views
of actual living people who adopted the Constitution and its
amendments.

53. See generally McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 1, at 785–90 (discussing the reasons for a supermajority requirement to amend the Constitution).
54. Amar, supra note 3, at 37–38.
55. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at ch. 3.
56. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2,
at 103–09.
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Perhaps the views of the hypothetical well-informed observer are to be preferred precisely because of his or her superior knowledge. People with greater political and legal
knowledge are likely to adopt better rules than those with
57
less. But if that is the true rationale for adopting the hypothetical observer’s viewpoint, why not simply follow whatever
legal rules a hypothetical well-informed observer would wish to
impose, regardless of whether they happen to accord with the
Constitution? For example, we could urge judges and other constitutional interpreters to impose whatever rules would be
adopted by highly knowledgeable observers in a hypothetical
social contract framework, such as John Rawls’s famous “origi58
nal position.”
In sum, the informed hypothetical observer theory does not
completely avoid the problem of political ignorance. If there is a
large gap between the hypothetical observer’s knowledge and
that of the general public, reliance on the former as the basis of
constitutional interpretation cuts against the major rationales
for adopting original meaning originalism in the first place.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF IGNORANCE FOR ORIGINAL INTENT
On the whole, political ignorance is far less of a problem for
the original intent version of originalism than for original
meaning. In contrast to original meaning’s emphasis on the
understanding of the general public, most theories of original
intent focus on the views of a small elite of constitutional fram59
ers. On average, these elites are likely to be highly knowledgeable about the constitutional issues they addressed. It is
not likely that that they lacked a clear intent on a key issue because they were simply ignorant about it. But this possibility
cannot be categorically ruled out. Even generally well-informed
elites might still be ignorant about the implications of a new
57. I argue for this idea in SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNOsupra note 10, at Introduction (explaining that effective democratic
accountability requires voters to have at least some political knowledge). See
generally CAPLAN, supra note 51.
58. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3–40 (1971) (laying
out the philosophical underpinnings for such a theory). For other well-known
hypothetical social contract theories, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY
AGREEMENT (1986).
59. For examples of the standard approach to original intent, see generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT
THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2005).
RANCE,
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part of the Constitution for some issues, especially if those issues were not a major focus of attention at the time of ratification.
Moreover, at least one prominent version of original intent
theory has a less elite-centric focus. Keith Whittington, a leading constitutional theorist, has advocated a version of original
intent that links the concept to popular sovereignty and takes
60
into account the intentions of the people as a whole. In Whittington’s view, originalism should be based on the “sovereign
61
intent” of the “popular will.”
This populist version of original intent has close affinities
with original meaning. Both shift the focus of interpretive attention from a small, elite group of framers to the general public; both implicitly assume a degree of knowledge on the part of
the latter. For these reasons, political ignorance is a potential
problem for the popular sovereignty model of original intent in
much the same way as for original meaning originalism. More
generally, the wider the range of people whose intent is considered relevant, the more likely it is that political ignorance is going to be a factor.
C. ASSESSING THE RELEVANT EXTENT OF POLITICAL IGNORANCE
Original meaning originalism’s implicit dependence on
public political knowledge may not be a problem if knowledge
levels are relatively high. In reality, however, the evidence suggests that they are often quite low. Both general political
knowledge and constitutional knowledge in particular leave
much to be desired.
1. Political Ignorance in the Modern Era
Decades of survey data reveal that the majority of the pub62
lic is at a very low level of political knowledge. Majorities are
often ignorant of very basic facts about politics and public policy. In the immediate aftermath of the 2010 election, only 46%
of adults knew that the Republicans won the House of Repre-

60. WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 110–59.
61. Id. at 155 (arguing that originalism preserves popular will and adheres to sovereign intent).
62. See supra text accompanying note 10, and infra text accompanying
note 71 (summarizing evidence of extensive voter ignorance).
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63

sentatives, but not the Senate. In 2004, 70% of the public
were unaware of the enactment of President George W. Bush’s
prescription drug plan, the largest new federal program in dec64
ades. A 2009 poll showed that only 24% of Americans realized
that an important “cap-and-trade” proposal then recently
passed by the House of Representatives as an effort to combat
65
global warming was an “environmental” policy. Some 46% believed that it was either a “health care reform” or a “regulatory
66
reform for Wall Street.”
Ignorance about basic aspects of the Constitution is also
extensive. For example, a 2006 Zogby poll found that 58% of
Americans cannot name the three branches of the federal gov67
ernment. Only 28% can name two or more of the five rights
68
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The majority also does
not know which branch of government has the power to declare
69
war. According to a 2002 survey, only 31% realize that Karl
Marx’s famous dictum “from each according to his ability, to
70
each according to his needs” is not in the Constitution.
Such widespread ignorance is not a recent phenomenon. It
dates back many decades to the very beginning of modern pub71
lic opinion polling in the 1930s. A 1952 survey found that only
63. Public Knows Basic Facts About Politics, Economics, but Struggles
with Specifics, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS, Nov. 18, 2010, at 1,
available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/677.pdf.
64. See Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss: How Political Ignorance
Threatens Democracy, 525 POL’Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 22, 2004, at 5–6, available at
http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/when-ignorance-isnt-bliss
-how-political-ignorance-threatens-democracy.
65. National Survey of 1,000 Likely Voters, RASMUSSEN REP. (May 7–8,
2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/toplines/pt_
survey_toplines/may_2009/toplines_cap_trade_i_may_7_8_2009.
66. Id.
67. Brit Hume, Zogby Poll: Most Americans Can Name Three Stooges, but
not Three Branches of Gov’t, FOX NEWS (Aug. 15, 2006), http://foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,208577,00.html.
68. Americans’ Awareness of First Amendment Freedoms, MCCORMICK
TRIB. FREEDOM MUSEUM (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.forumforeducation.org/
node/147.
69. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 10, at 70.
70. Michael C. Dorf, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway? What Americans
Don’t Know About Our Constitution—and Why It Matters, FINDLAW (May 29,
2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020529.html.
71. For studies showing the consistency of political ignorance over time,
see generally DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 10, at 62–134; ERIC R.A.N.
SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1989); Stephen E. Bennett,
“Know-Nothings” Revisited Again, 18 POL. BEHAV. 219, 219–31 (1996); Stephen E. Bennett, “Know-Nothings” Revisited: The Meaning of Political Igno-
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19% of Americans could name all three branches of the federal
government and only 27% could name at least two, an even
72
worse level of knowledge than today. Overall, knowledge levels have not increased significantly even in the wake of the
technological revolution in information technology wrought by
73
the internet and modern cable television.
2. Political Ignorance in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries
Obviously, modern evidence of political ignorance is only
indirectly relevant to the historical periods when the original
Constitution and its most important amendments were enacted: 1787–91 in the case of the original Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, and 1865–70 for the three Reconstruction amendments. Were political knowledge levels higher back then than
they are today? It is impossible to answer this question with
any certainty because we do not have systematic public opinion
74
polling for any period prior to the 1930s. There is no eighteenth and nineteenth century political knowledge data comparable to that which exists for the last seventy-five years.

rance Today, 69 SOC. SCI. Q. 476, 476–92 (1988); Stephen E. Bennett, Trends
in Americans’ Political Information, 1967–1987, 17 AM. POL. Q. 422 passim
(1989); Michael X. Delli Carpini & Scott Keeter, Stability and Change in the
U.S. Public’s Knowledge of Politics, 55 PUB. OPINION Q. 583, 590–93 (1991).
For an exception showing a very small increase in knowledge when comparing
the 1980–88 period to the 1990–98 period, see ALTHAUS, supra note 10, at 215.
The increase shown in Althaus’s study is very small (from an average of 52%
correct answers in the earlier period to 54% in the later one), and may be an
artifact of the particular questions studied. Id. For evidence of widespread political ignorance during the 1930s, see Somin, supra note 37, at 620–28.
72. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 10, at 71.
73. See, e.g., Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News
and Information Revolutions, article in What Americans Know: 1989–2007,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (Apr. 15, 2007), http://www
.people-press.org/2007/04/15/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed
-by-news-and-information-revolutions (showing little or no increase in political
knowledge since the rise of the internet and other modern media); see also
BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY IN
THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER 229–30 (2003) (arguing little or no increase in political knowledge since the rise of the internet and other modern
media); MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 60–61
(2009). See generally Markus Prior, News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing
Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout, 49 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 577 (2005).
74. See JOHN G. GEER, FROM TEA LEAVES TO OPINION POLLS 5 (1996) (describing origins of public opinion polling in the 1930s).
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Nonetheless, there is at least some reason to doubt that political knowledge levels in eighteenth and nineteenth century
America were especially high. One of the main reasons why political ignorance has proven to be so persistent over time is
75
that, for most citizens, it is actually rational behavior. Because the chance of any one vote influencing the outcome of an
election is infinitesimally small, there is little or no incentive to
become knowledgeable about politics if the only reason for do76
ing so is to become a “better” voter. The rationality of widespread political ignorance helps explain why it has persisted for
decades despite impressive increases in education levels and in
77
the availability of information through various types of media.
Although the cost of acquiring information has declined
thanks to modern technology, it is still high enough to make it
rational for most citizens to remain ignorant about most issues;
the key constraint on political knowledge is not the availability
of information, but citizens’ willingness to spend time and en78
ergy learning and understanding it. Rational ignorance may
have been an even greater barrier to information acquisition in
an era when information was more difficult to find than today,
literacy levels were much lower, and most people had to work
longer hours, leaving less time for learning about political issues.
At the time of ratification, some of the Founding Fathers
themselves believed that public knowledge of politics was low
and, worried about allowing too much public influence over pol79
icy. When the Constitution came up for ratification in Virginia, James Madison wrote in a letter to Thomas Jefferson that
the issue at hand “certainly surpasses the judgment of the
75. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at
ch. 3 (arguing that because one person’s vote has only an infinitesimal chance
of affecting the outcome of an election, voters remain ignorant).
76. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–59
(1957) (introducing the theory of rational political ignorance). For recent defenses and extensions of the theory, see generally CAPLAN, supra note 51, at
114–41; SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at
chs. 2–3, discussing the extent of voter ignorance and why this is rational behavior for most voters; and Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions in the Study of Political Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255, 257–60
(2006), discussing low individual utility of political knowledge for most voters.
77. For a detailed discussion of this point, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at ch. 3.
78. See id. at chs. 2, 4 (surveying the evidence in detail).
79. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC 3
(1992) (describing the Founders’ attitudes on this subject).

644

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:625

80

greater part of” the people of Virginia, though he also was
pleased that the people decided “contrary to their most popular
81
leaders,” many of whom were opposed to ratification.
Some readers may assume that the voters who chose delegates for the state ratifying conventions in 1787–88 were highly
knowledgeable because the franchise was tightly restricted.
82
However, the franchise was actually quite broad at the time.
By 1790, some 60–70% of white adult males were legally allowed to vote, even in spite of laws in many states that limited
83
the franchise to property owners. Moreover, eight of the thirteen states lowered their property qualifications for the ratifying convention election, and two others already had laws allow84
ing “virtually all” taxpaying adult male citizens to vote. Free
black males had the franchise on the same terms as whites in
85
five states. Despite the exclusion of women and most AfricanAmericans, states did not restrict the ratifying convention electorate to a small, highly knowledgeable elite. By the 1860s, the
period when the post-Civil War amendments were ratified, the
86
franchise was broader still.
The autonomous decision-making of late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century voters was to some degree restricted
by a tradition of deference to the judgment of social and politi87
cal elites.
The implications of deference for political
knowledge are ambiguous. On the positive side, one can view
deferential voters as being guided by the potentially superior
knowledge of elites. The knowledge of the latter could poten80. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 9, 1787), in 8
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA 227 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) [hereinafter Madison Letter to
Jefferson].
81. Id.
82. See ALEX KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (2000).
83. Id. at 54–60.
84. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 7, 503–05 (2005)
(detailing property qualifications by state). The three exceptions were Rhode
Island, Delaware, and Virginia. Id. at 505.
85. This was famously pointed out by Justice Benjamin Curtis in his dissent in the Dred Scott case. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 572–73
(1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
86. See KEYSSAR, supra note 82, at 50–52 (detailing substantial liberalization of franchise laws in the 1820s–1850s).
87. See, e.g., Ronald P. Formisano, Deferential-Participant Politics: The
Early Republic’s Political Culture, 1789–1840, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473
(1974) (describing how “deferential politics” was only slowly displaced by the
rise of political parties).
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tially be imputed to the former. On the other hand, deference
makes it less likely that voters would acquire and consider substantial information about constitutional issues on their own. It
is also unclear whether voters who participated in the elections
for ratifying convention delegates actually did behave in a def88
erential manner.
Possibly the most thorough modern study of American political engagement in the nineteenth century, Glenn Altschuler
and Stuart Blumin’s Rude Republic, finds that “the majority of
enfranchised citizens . . . turned only episodically and often in
qualified ways to political matters” and generally displayed
89
relatively low levels of interest in political issues. The crises of
secession and the Civil War may have led to an increase in po90
litical engagement. But even during the war, a large proportion of voters may have been “indifferen[t] to party tickets and
91
platforms,” demonstrating little knowledge of issues. After the
war—the period when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted—engagement may have returned to its previous, lower lev92
els. Other scholars contend that most nineteenth century voters based their decisions on “ethnocultural” affinity with their
preferred political party rather than detailed consideration of
93
issues. To the extent this was true, it makes it less likely that
they considered constitutional issues in any depth.
88. See, e.g., Madison Letter to Jefferson, supra note 80, at 227 (expressing his opinion that they did not have such deference, and indeed voted contrary to the judgment of “their most popular leaders”).
89. GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & STUART M. BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC:
AMERICANS AND THEIR POLITICS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 272 (2000)
[hereinafter ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC]. For other studies
reaching similar conclusions, see RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN
BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY, at ix (2004) (noting that “ordinary men” had a limited understanding of and interest in politics); RICHARD
J. JENSEN, GRASS ROOTS POLITICS: PARTIES, ISSUES, AND VOTERS, 1854 –1983,
at 29–35 (1983) (claiming that narrow material incentives, rather than careful
consideration of issues, often motivated nineteenth-century voters); Glen C.
Altschuler & Stuart M. Blumin, Limits of Political Engagement in Antebellum
America: A New Look at the Golden Age of Participatory Democracy, 84 J. AM.
HIST. 855 passim (1997); Samuel DeCanio, State Autonomy and American Political Development: How Mass Democracy Promoted State Power, 19 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 117, 118–21 (2005) (arguing that public ignorance in the nineteenth century was widespread).
90. ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC, supra note 89, at 155–60.
91. Id. at 177.
92. See generally id. at 184 –251.
93. For a discussion of this literature, see Ronald P. Formisano, The Invention of the Ethnocultural Interpretation, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 473 passim
(1994), and see also BENSEL, supra note 89, at 290, for an argument that such
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Altschuler and Blumin’s work relies on qualitative evi94
dence such as contemporary diaries and newspaper reports. It
is therefore difficult to tell whether or not their sources are fully representative of general popular attitudes. Instead, it may
be that these sources actually overstate levels of political
95
knowledge. The sorts of literate men who kept regular diaries
and read political coverage in the press were likely to have
been more knowledgeable than the average voter. Like James
96
Madison in 1787, future president Rutherford B. Hayes wrote
in 1875 that American democracy often amounted to “rule by
ignorance,” especially in areas with a “large uneducated popu97
lation.”
At the same time, some factors suggest that political
knowledge might have been higher in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than today. Government was considerably
smaller and simpler in that era than in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, which meant that there were far fewer
98
issues for voters to keep track of. As a result, the average
amount of knowledge per issue might have been higher than
today, even if the total amount of knowledge across all issues
was not. This would tend to increase knowledge of constitutional issues at the time of ratification, since these matters
would have fewer competitors for public attention than they
would today.
Similarly, the quantity, quality, and variety of public entertainment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
generally far lower than today. Nineteenth-century Americans
did not have television, radio, movies, the internet, or (until the
99
1870s) large-scale professional sports. As a result, many people attended political speeches and lectures in part as a form of

affinities were often more important determinants of voting decisions than issue platforms.
94. ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC, supra note 89, at 142–46.
95. I refer to men here because only men had the right to vote at the time.
96. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
97. DeCanio, supra note 89, at 126 n.82 (quoting Letter from R. Hayes to
J. Sherman (June 29, 1875), in 3 THE DIARY AND LETTERS OF RUTHERFORD B.
HAYES 262 (1922), available at ww2.ohiohistory.org/onlinedoc/hayes).
98. I emphasized this point in Somin, Voter Ignorance, supra note 10, at
434 –35.
99. The National League—the first major professional sports league—was
founded in 1876. See GEORGE VECSEY, BASEBALL: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S
FAVORITE GAME 31 (2006).
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100

entertainment.
The Lincoln-Douglas debates, for example,
101
drew large audiences who came in part for that reason. One
study claims that “half or more of the [mid-nineteenth century]
population” attended political speeches, rallies, picnics, and pa102
rades.
Even if political knowledge in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was significantly higher than today, it still
might not have translated into substantial public awareness of
the sorts of complex issues that interest modern jurists and
constitutional theorists. The average citizen in 1868 might well
have understood that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect the rights of recently freed African-Americans in
some general sense. But that does not mean he had any clear
idea of the full range of rights protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, whether the Amendment banned all racial
103
discrimination by state governments or just some types, or
whether the Equal Protection Clause was meant to establish a
104
general “anticaste principle.”
More research is needed to better understand the extent of
public knowledge on constitutional issues at the time when the
Constitution and its most important amendments were ratified.
At this point, the available evidence suggests that knowledge
levels were likely to have been relatively low. However, it is
certainly possible that future research will find important exceptions to this generalization, or potentially even overturn it.
D. VARIATION ACROSS ISSUES
Political ignorance is likely to be more of a problem for
originalists on some issues than others. It is least likely to matter when it comes to interpreting constitutional provisions that
are clear and precise and those that were widely debated at the
105
time of enactment. The implications of ignorance may also
differ as between those parts of the Constitution that use tech106
nical legal language and ones that do not.
100. See, e.g., JENSEN, supra note 89, at 31 (suggesting that these activities
were as much a form of entertainment as golf, tennis, and skiing are today).
101. ALLEN C. GUELZO, LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS: THE DEBATES THAT DEFINED AMERICA, at xvii–xviii (2009).
102. JENSEN, supra note 89, at 31.
103. See generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1991)
(describing controversy over this issue at the time of ratification).
104. See sources cited supra note 28.
105. See discussion infra Part I.D.1.
106. See discussion infra Part I.D.3.

648

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:625

1. Textual Ambiguity
Ignorance is less likely to be a problem for determining the
original meaning of clear and precise parts of the Constitution,
as opposed to more ambiguous ones. For example, Article II of
the Constitution sets out very clear qualification requirements
for the presidency, mandating that the president must be thirty-five years old, a “natural born” American citizen, and a resi107
dent of the United States for at least fourteen years. Even a
voter with little or no knowledge of politics is unlikely to have
any difficulty interpreting this provision, despite the attempts
of a few legal scholars to claim that it is more complex than it
108
seems. It is possible, of course, that many people at the time
of ratification might simply have been unaware of the existence
of a clause in the Constitution setting out qualifications for the
presidency. But at least anyone who read the clause was likely
to have a clear sense of its meaning, even if they knew little or
nothing about contemporary law and politics. The same goes for
many other parts of the Constitution that are similarly unambiguous. For example, it is easy to grasp the meaning of the re109
quirement that each state is entitled to two senators, or that
110
the president serves a four-year term and can only be reelect111
ed once after serving a complete first term.
The situation is very different for those clauses that use
broad or ambiguous language. For example, the text of the
Equal Protection Clause does not clearly indicate what types of
discrimination are forbidden, either with respect to the range of
issues covered or the types of classifications that are to be
banned. Both questions have been much debated by legal
scholars and jurists from the nineteenth century to the pre112
sent. Similarly, Article II of the Constitution does not clearly
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
108. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1151, 1174 (1985) (suggesting that scholars could interpret the age requirement to mean merely that the president must have at least as much maturity as the average thirty-five-year-old).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
112. See, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (unsuccessful
early effort to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade discrimination
against women, but that argument was nonetheless endorsed by the Supreme
Court Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase); KULL, supra note 103, at 67–112 (describing some of the debates on these issues at the time of the framing and
soon after).
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specify the limits of the president’s wartime executive powers.
Scholars and jurists are deeply divided over the question of
what the original meaning requires here. Some endorse a very
broad interpretation of executive authority, while others argue
113
for a much narrower one.
These include such issues as
whether the president has the power to begin an armed conflict
without congressional consent, and whether he needs congressional authorization to take such measures as trying prisoners
114
in military commissions.
The First Amendment does not clearly specify what forms
115
of expression are protected by the Free Speech Clause. As a
result, there is great disagreement over such issues as whether
the original meaning of the Clause protects symbolic expres116
sion, and whether it protects speech by corporations as well
117
as “natural” persons.
Many more such examples can be cited. The key point is
that a large proportion of the most contentious issues in constitutional interpretation are cases where the text does not provide a clear indication of original meaning by itself. To address
this problem, scholars and jurists have to resort to extrinsic evidence of meaning, such as tradition, precedent, statements by
legal and political elites, and so on. These are precisely the
sorts of evidence that relatively ignorant voters might not have
been aware of at the time of ratification. While even a voter
with little or no political knowledge can easily discern the
meaning of a constitutional provision that is simple and clear,
the same is not true of more complex and ambiguous clauses.

113. Compare MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (2007) (arguing for a narrow interpretation), with JOHN YOO, THE
POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER
9/11 (2005) (defending a very broad interpretation).
114. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (latest of
several closely divided Supreme Court decisions on the military commission
issue); RAMSEY, supra note 113, at 91–114 (arguing that the original meaning
supports a relatively narrow interpretation of wartime executive power); YOO,
supra note 113, at 143–81 (defending broad interpretation).
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
116. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057 (2009) (challenging the conventional wisdom that the original meaning did not protect symbolic expression).
117. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (resulting
in a closely divided 5-4 decision on this issue where the majority and dissent
disagreed on the original meaning of the First Amendment, among other disputed points).
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This is not to say that low-knowledge voters are necessarily completely ignorant about the latter. A low-knowledge voter
might still have at least a general sense of a clause’s meaning.
For example, he or she might realize that the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment protects political speech
118
against flagrant attempts at censorship by the government,
or that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the most blatant
forms of state government discrimination against AfricanAmericans, such as the “Black Codes” that many southern
119
states enacted in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War.
Given the evidence suggesting that much of the public in
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is often ignorant about
120
even very basic political information,
we cannot take for
granted the idea that most voters at the time of ratification understood even relatively simple elements of the amendments
that were being enacted. But it is at least plausible to believe
that many did understand these points—or least would have
easily grasped them upon reading the constitutional text. By
contrast, public knowledge of more complex points that are not
immediately evident in the text is likely to have been significantly lower.
2. Prominence of Issues at the Time of Ratification
Ignorance is also especially likely to be a problem in the
case of interpretive questions that were not widely discussed at
the time of enactment but which have become important since.
These include such crucial modern issues as how the First
121
Amendment applies to new technology
and whether Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause extend to the regulation of activity that is remote from actual trade and move122
ment across state lines.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
119. See, e.g., THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 61–
80, 96–115 (1965) (describing the Black Codes). For a discussion on the role of
the Black Codes in inspiring the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example,
AMAR, supra note 84, at 383–85.
120. See supra Part I.C.1.
121. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment allows for greater regulation over the new
technology of television).
122. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (holding that the
Commerce Clause allows Congress to forbid the possession of medical marijuana even in cases where the marijuana had never crossed state lines or been
sold in any market anywhere).
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The implications of the Fourteenth Amendment for racial
discrimination were widely debated at the time of ratification,
making it more likely that members of the public would have at
123
least some relevant knowledge on this issue. By contrast,
there was much less debate about the potential impact of the
124
Amendment for gender discrimination, and almost none at all
for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Public ignorance would therefore be more of an obstacle to efforts to determine the original meaning of the Amendment with respect
to the latter two issues.
3. Technical Legal Terms Versus Ordinary Language Terms
Initially, it may seem obvious that political ignorance is
likely to be more of a problem when it comes to the original
meaning of many technical legal phrases in the Constitution
than with respect to those clauses that use ordinary language.
125
Phrases such as “Bill of Attainder,” “privileges or immuni126
127
ties,” and “Habeas Corpus” are likely to be unintelligible to
voters lacking in legal training. If so, the presence of many
such legal terms of art in the Constitution could exacerbate the
problem of political ignorance from the standpoint of original
meaning.
However, it is possible that legal terms of art actually create less of a challenge than those clauses of the Constitution
that use ordinary language. If a phrase in the Constitution
looks like a technical term, ordinary citizens might assume that
it is a legal term of art that they can leave to the experts to interpret. They could deliberately decide to delegate the task of
128
interpreting it to judges and other legal experts.
In that
event, the original meaning might simply be that interpretation
of the term is to be left up to judges using professional interpre129
tive tools.

123. See KULL, supra note 103, at 67–87 (discussing the extensive deliberation that led to the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
124. For a recent review of the evidence, see Calabresi & Rickert, supra
note 1, at 51–57.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
128. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note
1, at 765 (asserting that the public might allow lawyers to determine the
meaning of certain aspects of the Constitution).
129. Id. at 772.
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By contrast, it is unlikely that citizens would make a similar assumption about plain language provisions of the Constitution, which include such ordinary sounding terms as “Equal
130
131
132
Protection,”
“liberty,”
“property,”
and “Commerce . . .
133
among the several States.” In some cases, these seemingly
ordinary terms could still have a technical meaning for legal
experts. But it is unlikely that members of the general public—
134
even “reasonable” ones —would have understood them in that
way.
Most voters might plausibly assume that seemingly ordinary language in the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with everyday usage rather than some technical
meaning known only to legal experts. The Supreme Court itself
has emphasized that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
135
meaning.”
This principle was recently reaffirmed by the
136
Court in District of Columbia v. Heller. If even Supreme
Court Justices assume that the Constitution was written in ordinary language intended to be understood by laypeople, voters
might well see it that way too.
It also seems unlikely that voters would be willing to give
the experts a blank check to interpret parts of the Constitution
that implicate major ideologically contested issues. For example, it is doubtful that voters in 1787 would have agreed to allow legal professionals unconstrained authority to determine
the scope of federal power under Article I of the Constitution,
or that the voters of 1868 would have given them similar control over the determination of what kinds of discrimination are
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is, of course, theoretically possible that the voters at the
time of ratification chose to leave constitutional interpretation
completely to the discretion of legal experts, using whatever
methods the latter deemed appropriate. But the existence of
such an extraordinarily high degree of deference to expertise
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
134. For works that claim that original meaning is the meaning understood
by “reasonable” observers at the time, see sources cited supra note 29.
135. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931).
136. 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008).
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would, at the very least, have to be proven by historical research, not simply assumed. And it is unlikely to have been
present throughout the ratification of the original Constitution
and subsequent amendments. Broad deference of this kind may
be plausible with regards to interpretation of uncontroversial
technical points, but seems less likely on major substantive issues of the sort that are the focus of the most important controversies over constitutional interpretation. The extent to which
the public at the time of the Founding and the enactment of the
post-Civil War amendments was willing to defer to expert opinion on constitutional issues is an important potential topic for
future research.
In sum, the issues on which political ignorance is likely to
be an especially serious problem are often the very ones that
are most controversial today: cases where the text of the Constitution is imprecise and the issue was not a major focus of
public discussion at the time of ratification. In these cases, voter ignorance may make it difficult or impossible to determine
what the original meaning is, or even whether there was a single meaning endorsed by the majority of the public at all.
II. SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
Although the problem of political ignorance creates a serious challenge for original meaning originalism, there are several potential solutions. Here, I review some of the most important: reliance on elite opinion, deriving the original meaning
from contemporary media coverage, information shortcuts, and
a hybrid approach that combines two or more of the above.
Each of these potential solutions has some merit. But each also
has important shortcomings. Ultimately, there may not be any
one solution that fully addresses the issue. There may be some
situations where the challenge posed by political ignorance is
insuperable.
A. RELYING ON THE OPINIONS OF INFORMED ELITES
The simplest and perhaps most obvious originalist solution
to the problem of political ignorance is to base interpretations
of original meaning on the views of informed legal and political
elites. The elites can be used as proxies for the general public.
This differs from the strategy of defining original meaning itself in terms of the views of a hypothetical well-informed ob-
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137

server. The latter seeks to ascertain the views of a hypothetical construct, while the former focuses on those of actual wellinformed elites in the real world. In addition, original meaning
originalists who rely on elite opinion are presumably doing so
for the purpose of determining the meaning of the Constitution
for the population as a whole rather than those elites alone.
Although no major theorist of originalism has explicitly
advocated relying on elite opinion exclusively, much originalist
138
research relies heavily on elites’ views in practice. This is understandable in light of the fact that elites tend to think about
constitutional meaning in greater depth than ordinary voters
and leave a far more extensive written record of their opinions.
Some degree of reliance on elite opinion is probably an inevitable attribute of originalist jurisprudence. In many cases,
139
political elites really do represent public opinion accurately.
As already noted, in some situations the voters might deliberately choose to support an imprecise amendment and then
leave it to judges and other legal elites to work out the details
140
of application.
However, exclusive or near-exclusive reliance on elite
views creates serious problems for originalists. One danger is
that it leaves original meaning vulnerable to the same sorts of
criticisms that undermined the previously dominant original
intent version of originalism. The classic attacks on original intent that undermined its reputation in the minds of many jurists and scholars were that it was unworkable because it is
impossible to ascertain the intentions of a multitude of Fram141
ers, and that the Framers themselves did not want their in-

137. See supra Part I.A.3.
138. For well-known recent works of originalist scholarship that rely extensively on elite interpretations to ascertain original meaning see, for example, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998); BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3; BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2; PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL
DUTY (2008); RAMSEY, supra note 113; Amar, supra note 3.
139. See, e.g., SHMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE TOLERANT PUBLIC 54 –88 (1999) (showing a variety of surveys
demonstrating that elites and the public have similar views on many civil liberties issues).
140. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note
1, at 765 (suggesting this possibility). But see supra Part I.A.2 (noting some
limitations of this argument).
141. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 229–31 (1980).
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142

tentions to be a guide for constitutional interpretation. Original meaning originalism achieved its present popularity in
143
large part because it avoids these problems.
But if original meaning is determined solely by considering
the views of contemporary political elites, it would exhibit
many of the same flaws as original intent after all. Trying to
ascertain a single coherent interpretation from the views of
multiple elite commentators risks the same problem of incoherence as trying to meld together the original intentions of multi144
ple Framers. Indeed, it may be more difficult, since the commentators probably include a wider range of viewpoints than
the Framers did. The former are more likely to include opponents as well as supporters of the constitutional provision at issue. Similarly, if it turns out that the relevant elites believed
that their views should not guide later judicial interpretations
145
of the Constitution, then ignoring this aspect of their interpretive methodology while embracing the general view that
their views are binding seems contradictory.
Exclusive reliance on elite views also undercuts some of the
other arguments used to justify original meaning as a normative theory. For example, some scholars contend that the original meaning should guide judicial interpretations of the Constitution because it was adopted through a supermajoritarian
146
political process. However, that may not be true of elite interpretations of the document that are unknown to most of the
general public. No supermajority ever approved them. Similarly, reliance on elite interpretation is in tension with claims that
the original meaning is special because it has the legitimacy of
popular consent to a “public act” of lawmaking at the time of
147
enactment. The public cannot be said to have accepted an

142. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 903–13 (1985).
143. For detailed discussions of these criticisms and the reasons why original meaning originalism is not vulnerable to them, see BARNETT, RESTORING
THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 89–100, and Lawrence B. Solum,
What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory 6–17
(Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543, describing the
rise of original meaning as the dominant school of originalist thought.
144. See Brest, supra note 141, at 229–31.
145. See Powell, supra note 142, at 903–13.
146. See sources cited supra notes 47, 53–54.
147. See BORK, supra note 1, at 144 –45.
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elite interpretation of the Constitution of which they were not
148
even aware.
Despite these criticisms, originalists can, to some degree,
rely on elite views to help ascertain original meaning. In some
cases, elite views really are a good proxy for public views, and
the latter may sometimes choose to delegate more technical interpretative issues to the former. For example, survey data
suggests that public and legal elite opinion on many civil liberties and defendants’ rights issues are far less divergent than is
149
often assumed. To the extent this was true at the time of the
Founding, elite opinion could serve as a useful proxy for public
opinion on these questions. But whether either of these scenarios actually occurred in a particular situation has to be proven
by evidence, not simply assumed.
In many cases, unfortunately, the opinions of knowledgeable elites might differ from those of the general public. Differences in political knowledge are often highly correlated with
150
differing opinions on issues. In other situations, the public
might simply be unaware of the issues considered by elites.
When that occurs, there may be no clear original public meaning even if there is a great deal of agreement among legal
elites.
Contemporary elite interpretations of the Constitution will
always be an important resource for originalists. But it is dangerous to place exclusive reliance on them—at least in cases
where political ignorance makes it unlikely that the elites’
views are representative of those of the general public.
B. RELIANCE ON MEDIA COVERAGE AIMED AT THE GENERAL
PUBLIC
If elites are not always a reliable guide to understanding
the public, why not look at information available in media directed at the ordinary voter? Newspapers and other publications intended to be read by the general public may provide a
better guide to voters’ understanding of the Constitution at the
time of enactment than the statements of well-informed elites.
In an important recent article, George C. Thomas III advocates
precisely this strategy and uses extensive evidence from con148. A possible exception could be a case where the public trusts elites to
come up with an interpretation to such an extent that they do not check to see
what the result was.
149. See LOCK, supra note 139, at 35–58 (describing the relevant evidence).
150. See sources cited supra note 10.
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temporary newspapers to shed interesting light on the perennial question of whether or not the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to incorpo151
rate the Bill of Rights against the states.
Contemporaneous media accounts can indeed be a useful
resource for originalists, and more scholars should emulate
Thomas’s research strategy. Modern databases make it possible
to search a much wider range of nineteenth-century newspa152
pers in a short period of time than was possible in the past.
But it would be a mistake to assume that most of the public is necessarily aware of information published in the media.
Modern survey research shows that the majority of the public is
often ignorant of basic facts that received extensive media cov153
154
erage. Many such examples could be cited. Political ignorance often extends even to relatively basic matters that
knowledgeable insiders take for granted. It is likely to be even
more severe on detailed points of constitutional interpretation
that are controversial among scholars and jurists.
Media interpretations may also fail to accurately represent
public opinion for a different reason: reporters and editors often
hold views on political and legal issues that vary greatly from
those of the general population. Over the last several decades,
survey research and content analysis strongly suggests that the
majority of editors and reporters are significantly more liberal
155
than the average of the general population. Whether media
opinion diverged from public opinion to a comparable degree in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is far less clear. We do
not have systematic quantitative survey data on either elite or
151. George C. Thomas III, Newspapers and the Fourteenth Amendment:
What Did the American Public Know About Section 1?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 323, 353–59 (2009). Michael Kent Curtis previously made more limited
use of newspaper sources to address the same question. See MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 132–35 (1986); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics,
Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the
United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1137–38 (2000).
152. See Thomas, supra note 151, at 323–27 (describing the relevant databases and noting that they include thousands of different publications).
153. See examples discussed supra Part I.C.1.
154. See SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at
ch. 1 (listing many examples); see also DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note
10, at 70−71 (same).
155. See, e.g., TIM GROSECLOSE, LEFT TURN (2011) (presenting evidence
that the media today is more liberal than the general population); S. ROBERT
LICHTER ET AL., THE MEDIA ELITE 20−53 (1986) (discussing survey evidence
for reporters in the 1970s and 1980s).
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156

public opinion during those periods. But we should at least be
aware of the possibility.
Diverging ideologies will not necessarily lead members of
the media to interpret the Constitution differently from ordinary citizens. Some issues are so clear that any reasonably intelligent observer will come to the same conclusion. In other
cases, reporters and citizens might be able to resist the effects
of ideological predispositions and come to more objective judgments. Nonetheless, ideology often does have an influence on
constitutional interpretation, and members of the media are no
more immune to its effects than lawyers, judges, and academ157
ics.
Despite these limitations, media evidence is a useful source
of data that originalist scholars are only beginning to fully exploit. Some of its potential shortcomings can potentially be
remedied through more careful research. For example, the
problem of ideological bias can be mitigated by looking for areas of agreement between media sources that have different political biases. Cases where both Republican and Democratic
newspapers agreed on the meaning of an important provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment qualify as more powerful evidence
than ones where partisans of the two sides differed. Ideological
bias is also more easily detectable in nineteenth-century media,
an era when most newspapers were openly identified with a political party.
Nonetheless, there is no clear way to solve the problem of
cases where information that is widely available in the media
nonetheless fails to penetrate the consciousness of most of the
public. In such situations, media evidence may well be an unreliable guide to the beliefs of the general population.
C. INFORMATION SHORTCUTS
Some scholars claim that political ignorance is relatively
unimportant because even comparatively ignorant voters can
158
use “information shortcuts” to offset their lack of knowledge.
156. See GEER, supra note 74, at 2−5 ( describing the lack of public opinion
polls prior to the 1930s).
157. For evidence of ideological effects on judicial interpretation, see, for
example, SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 52, passim.
158. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: A SECOND LOOK 171−76
(2011); VINCENT L. HUTCHINGS, PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY: HOW CITIZENS LEARN ABOUT POLITICS 11 (2003); ARTHUR LUPIA &
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN
WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 13 (1998); PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 79, at
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Such shortcuts enable generally ignorant voters to use small
bits of information as a substitute for larger bodies of
knowledge. Possible shortcuts include deriving information
from party identification (where a candidate’s policies can be
159
inferred from those of his party), reliance on better-informed
160
“opinion leaders,” “retrospective voting” by which voters can
gauge a party’s or candidate’s future performance based on
161
162
their past record, and others. So far, there have not been
any studies of the extent to which voters may have used information shortcuts to try to determine the meaning of the original Constitution or major amendments at the time of enactment. We therefore do not know to what degree such shortcuts
may have offset the effects of political ignorance.
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that shortcuts fully solved
the problem or came close to doing so. Elsewhere, I have argued
that information shortcuts are often insufficient to make up for
ignorance of basic political information, and in some cases may
163
even make the problem worse. Even most of the more optimistic research on shortcuts does not claim that shortcuts enable voters to understand complex, nuanced issues in a sophisti164
cated way. Rather, they contend that these shortcuts help
voters get a basic understanding of the issues at stake and

1−37 (proposing that the shortcuts individuals take in gathering knowledge
still lead to a rational public opinion); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING
VOTER 44−72 (1991) (examining shortcuts voters take in evaluating, obtaining,
and storing information to fill gaps in knowledge); DONALD A. WITTMAN, THE
MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE 12−14 (1995) (arguing that informed judgments can be made with little information); Philip E. Converse, Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information, in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 369, 382 (John A. Ferejohn & James Kuklinski eds., 1990).
159. See, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 158, at 176 (discussing how the goals,
policies, and records of parties lead to a sense of partisan identification).
160. See, e.g., HUTCHINGS, supra note 158, at 30−31 (discussing media coverage and the possibility of constituents relying on other elites, such as political challengers or interest group leaders); LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note
158, at 184−201 ( arguing that reliance on opinion leaders is a useful information shortcut).
161. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 6–11 (1981) (presenting a classic account of
this idea).
162. For a review and critique of many different shortcut mechanisms, see
SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10, at ch. 4.
163. See id.; Somin, supra note 64, at 9−15.
164. See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 158, at 71 (listing limitations and broad
assumptions that information shortcuts require).
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make a reasonably informed choice between competing candi165
dates in an election.
Information shortcuts might enable voters to understand
some basic aspects of various constitutional provisions at the
time of enactment. For example, they could use shortcuts to
deduce that the original Constitution gave Congress greater
powers to regulate, tax, and spend than it possessed under the
Articles of Confederation, or that the Fourteenth Amendment
was “designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all
the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white per166
sons.” But this is a far cry from being able to use shortcuts to
determine what sorts of activities Article I of the Constitution
allows Congress to regulate, or understand the implications of
the Fourteenth Amendment for state discrimination on nonracial grounds. It may also not have been enough to enable voters
to determine what rights actually qualify as civil rights protected by the Amendment, as opposed to political and social
167
rights that perhaps were not.
In addition, information shortcuts are likely to be less useful with respect to issues that were not a central focus of public
debate at the time the relevant constitutional provision was
ratified. Parties, opinion leaders, and other sources of information shortcuts were less likely to take clear positions on such
low-visibility issues, and voters are therefore less likely to pick
up on them. The more complex the issue in question and the
less it was a major focus of contention at the time of ratification, the less likely it is that voters would have successfully
used information shortcuts to determine the implications of the
provision for that issue.
While we do not have scientific survey data on voter
knowledge and the use of information shortcuts in 1787, 1791
or 1868, there is some partially relevant, more-recent evidence
from studies of voter performance on state constitutional referendum initiatives. Some studies claim that relatively ignorant
voters can effectively leverage information shortcuts to vote in
168
accordance with their policy preferences on such initiatives.
165. See sources cited supra note 158.
166. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
167. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing between these three and claiming that the Amendment protects only “civil rights,” which did not include, in his view, the right to serve on
a jury).
168. See, e.g., THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 87−89 (1999) (concluding that voter competence in initiatives is not as good as would be desirable,
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Others are much more pessimistic, concluding that political ig169
norance often skews voter decisions. But even the more optimistic scholars do not claim that voters understand the detailed implications of ballot initiatives or their potential impact
on issues that go beyond those that were the central focus of
public debate at the time of the vote. Rather, they claim that
voters can use shortcuts to make a roughly accurate decision
about whether or not voting in favor of the initiative will pro170
mote their policy preferences or not.
This is a long way from the more complex interpretive issues that are the focus of many debates over original meaning.
An 1868 voter using such information shortcuts might correctly
conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment is preferable to the
preexisting status quo because he generally favors giving recently freed slaves greater legal protections. But that does not
mean he would have any idea of the full range of rights that
might be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the
full extent to which the Equal Protection Clause forbids racial
discrimination, or its implications for laws that discriminate on
the basis of other characteristics, such as gender or homosexuality.
Moreover, both the original Constitution and several of the
most important amendments differ from referendum initiatives
in a crucial way that increases the knowledge burden on voters.
but still relatively strong); Craig M. Burnett et al., The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 317 (2010) (“[U]ninformed voters appear to
make decisions that are indistinguishable from voters who have knowledge of
key facts and voters who have knowledge of a voting cue.”); Arthur Lupia,
Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 72 (1994) (concluding that uninformed voters effectively emulate those who are well-informed).
169. See, e.g., Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949,
961−65 (2005) (concluding that voters often ignore relevant tradeoffs and context); Shauna Reilly & Sean Richey, Ballot Question Readability and Roll-Off:
The Impact of Language Complexity, 64 POL. RES. Q. 59, 66 (2009) (concluding
that most ballot questions are too complex for the majority of voters to understand); Craig M. Burnett, Informed Democracy? How Voter Knowledge of Initiatives Influences Consistent Voting 16−17 (undated) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/political_science/state_
politics/conferences/2009/papers/20.pdf (finding low levels of cue knowledge
and little evidence of such knowledge affecting vote choice in ballot-initiative
elections); Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent
30−31 (UC Davis Legal Studies Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 285,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010115 (reviewing recent pessimistic literature on this issue).
170. See sources cited supra note 168.
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In many states, the range of issues covered by a referendum initiative is limited by the “single subject rule,” which prevents a
ballot question from addressing more than one issue at a
171
172
time. Although the merits of this rule are debatable, it does
at least somewhat reduce the amount of information voters
need to understand any given initiative.
By contrast, the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights,
and the Fourteenth Amendment all addressed a wide range of
issues simultaneously, many of them complex and multifaceted.
The 1787 Constitution allocates numerous different powers to
Congress, establishes the structure of the executive and the judiciary, and addresses a variety of other issues as well. The Bill
of Rights includes many different rights, from freedom of
speech, to property rights, to criminal procedure. And the Fourteenth Amendment has several complex and open-ended clauses, such as the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. This variety and complexity makes it less
likely that voters dedicated the time and effort to considering
all of the relevant issues, or indeed any beyond a small fraction
of them.
Another relevant body of evidence is my own earlier work
testing Bruce Ackerman’s claim that voters increase their
knowledge levels during constitutional moments—periods of
constitutional change that may operate outside the Article V
173
process. Unlike in the case of 1787 and 1868, Ackerman’s
theory is subject to testing by survey evidence, since one of his
three major constitutional moments is the New Deal constitutional revolution of the 1930s, a period that coincided with the
174
rise of modern public opinion polling. My article demonstrated that political knowledge levels generally remained low during the relevant period and that some of the major New Dealera changes in constitutional legal doctrine probably lacked
175
majority public support.
Neither state constitutional referenda nor the 1930s constitutional moment are perfect analogues for the events of 1787
and 1868. It is possible that voters pay less attention to state
constitutional change than federal because the stakes are usu171. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy
and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 704−09 (2010).
172. See id. at 709−12 (describing opposing arguments).
173. See Somin, supra note 37.
174. See id. at 620.
175. Id. at 620−63.
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ally lower. It is also possible that public knowledge levels were
176
higher in 1787 or 1868 than in the 1930s. It is even possible
that voters paid more attention to constitutional issues because
the use of the formal amendment process alerted them to the
fact that constitutional change was on the table. The constitutional stakes may have been more ambiguous in the 1930s,
when the relevant change occurred outside the bounds of Article V. The evidence from these two sources is necessarily suggestive rather than definitive.
At the same time, it is notable that both types of evidence
seem to support the conclusion that voter ignorance is often a
serious problem when constitutional changes are under consideration. It is also worth reiterating that some of the differences
between constitutional referenda and the New Deal period on
the one hand, and 1787 and 1868 on the other imply that political knowledge may have been higher during the later period.
Modern media made it easier to acquire political information
today and—to a lesser extent—in the 1930s than in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And the limited scope of referendum initiatives imposes a lower knowledge burden on voters
than did the sweeping constitutional transformations of the
Founding and Reconstruction periods.
Despite my skepticism about the possibility that information shortcuts can solve the problem of political ignorance
with respect to original meaning, this is an issue that requires
greater study. Scholars have conducted only very limited research on the extent of public knowledge about constitutional
177
change in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is possible that future scholarship will discover that voters used information shortcuts to assess the meaning of various provisions
of the Constitution on least some important issues. These may
include some where effective use of such shortcuts seems initially unlikely.
Unfortunately, the necessary research will be difficult to
conduct because of the absence of scientific public opinion surveys prior to the 1930s. Scholars will therefore have to rely on

176. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing differences between those eras and
the modern period).
177. See discussion in supra Part I.C.2.
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more anecdotal data, such as diaries, political communications
178
targeted at lay audiences, and others.
D. HYBRID STRATEGIES
Reliance on elite accounts, evidence from contemporary
media, and information shortcuts all have significant shortcomings as potential solutions to the challenge of political ignorance for originalists. But it is possible that a hybrid approach
that makes use of all three strategies simultaneously might do
better. For example, an interpretation of a constitutional provision that is supported by both elite statements and contemporary media accounts is more likely to be an accurate description
of what the general public believed than a theory that is supported by only one of these two types of evidence. The theory
becomes even stronger if it is also backed by evidence suggesting that voters became aware of it by using information
shortcuts.
To some extent, the differing methodologies may compensate for each other’s weaknesses. For example, one of the shortcomings of relying on elite interpretations alone is that elites
often rely on information that is unknown to most of the gen179
eral public. Media evidence can partly remedy that flaw because press accounts are usually geared to the ordinary layperson rather than knowledgeable elites. Moreover, an
interpretation that is advanced by a broad cross-section of both
elites and the media is more likely to be picked up by “rationally ignorant” voters than one that is promoted by only one of
these sources.
Since research on the relationship between original meaning and political ignorance is only beginning, it is likely that
new approaches to the problem will emerge. Both law professors and scholars from other disciplines, such as economics,
history, and political science, may have much to contribute on
this score.
At the same time, there may well be important cases where
the challenge of political ignorance is insuperable. Given widespread political ignorance on even fairly basic issues, it is quite
possible that there are some important constitutional questions
on which there is no original meaning because most of the pub178. For an important example of research on nineteenth-century public
opinion utilizing such sources, see ALTSCHULER & BLUMIN, RUDE REPUBLIC,
supra note 89, passim.
179. See supra Part II.A.
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lic was simply unaware of either the question or the possible
answers to it. Indeed, historical research into particular issues
might actually reinforce such a conclusion by providing additional evidence in support of it. Some issues may even have
been deliberately ignored by political elites or the media for the
purposes of avoiding public attention. A rationally ignorant
public might be more vulnerable to such manipulation than one
180
that is better-informed.
III. MODIFYING AND LIMITING ORIGINALISM
Instead of seeking to solve the problem of political ignorance within the confines of existing theories of original meaning, advocates of originalism could instead address it by modifying the theories themselves or limiting their scope. The
former might be achieved by interpreting ambiguous parts of
the Constitution in ways that are more literal and intuitive; the
latter by relying less on interpretation and more on construction.
Given widespread political ignorance, it is arguable that
originalists are more likely to find a consensus original meaning by using literal and intuitive, rather than metaphorical,
meanings of disputed phrases. A literal meaning is more likely
to be understood by a casual reader of the text who has little
knowledge of the political or legal controversies that led to an
amendment. For example, there is a longstanding debate over
whether the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment should
be interpreted to restrict the power of eminent domain to cases
of literal “public use”—where the condemned property is owned
by the government or the public has a legal right of access to
it—or figurative “uses” such as transfers to private parties that
181
provide a public benefit. While it is possible that a sophisticated legal interpreter at the time of the Founding would have
182
interpreted public use to mean any sort of public benefit, this
180. For the argument that public ignorance increases vulnerability to manipulation, see SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE, supra note 10,
at ch. 3.
181. This longstanding debate was most recently considered by the United
States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Justice Clarence Thomas presented originalist arguments for the literal view.
Id. at 507−11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority endorsed the figurative
view. Id. at 473−78.
182. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 859−80
(1995) (defending this claim).
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seems unlikely in the case of a less knowledgeable member of
the general public.
Obviously, preferring literal meanings to figurative ones is
not a panacea. In some cases, there may be more than one possible literal meaning of a particular clause of the Constitution.
In others, resort to the literal meaning may simply not be
enough to answer the question of how the clause applies to the
problem at hand. For example, nothing in the literal meaning
of “equal protection of the laws” gives us an answer to the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids state discrimination on the basis of gen183
der. To answer that question from an originalist perspective,
184
we would have to look to other kinds of evidence. Finally, in
some cases, it is possible that most of the public really did understand and endorse a figurative meaning rather than a literal one. Widespread political ignorance reduces the likelihood
of such an outcome. But it certainly does not make it impossible. At most, therefore, the preference for literal meanings
should be a presumption rather than a rigid rule. And even the
presumption is only a tentative suggestion. Although it could
help address the problem posed by political ignorance, it might
suffer from other weaknesses that outweigh this potential advantage.
Even with a presumption in favor of literal meanings,
there are likely to be cases where political ignorance makes it
difficult or impossible to establish any clear original meaning.
Originalists could try to address some of these hard cases by relying more on construction rather than interpretation of the
185
text. As Randy Barnett puts it, “[c]onstitutional construction
fills the inevitable gaps created by the vagueness of [the] . . .
186
words [of the text] when applied to particular circumstances.”
Taking due account of political ignorance might lead to the conclusion that there are more gaps in the original meaning than

183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
184. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 1, passim (surveying that
evidence).
185. For originalist scholarship explicating this distinction, see, for example, BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 3, at 3−6, 104−05; BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 118
−3 0; KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).
186. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 100.
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we would like to believe. If so, more analytical heavy lifting
may have to be done by construction and less by interpretation.
This might well be a perfectly acceptable result. But it has
two potential downsides from an originalist perspective. One is
that fewer constitutional problems will be solved by analysis of
original meaning and more by other means. Resorting to construction might shore up originalism’s theoretical underpinnings. But this gain would come at the cost of making
originalism less useful for addressing real-world constitutional
controversies. More of the heavy lifting needed to resolve these
issues would be done by construction and less by the original
meaning of the text.
Second, greater reliance on construction diminishes one of
the potential advantages of originalism: the possibility that it
will give us determinate answers to disputed constitutional
questions and limit judicial discretion. If the original meaning
leaves numerous gaps for courts to fill in by applying construction, there are likely to be more opportunities for judges to
make decisions on the basis of their own ideological or political
187
preferences.
CONCLUSION
The reality of widespread political ignorance poses a serious challenge for original meaning originalism, a theory that
has attracted widespread support among constitutional theorists. In some cases, there may not be any clear original meaning of a constitutional provision because a rationally ignorant
electorate simply did not know about the issue. In others, public ignorance may make the original meaning more difficult to
discern. These difficulties are particularly acute with respect to
constitutional issues that are complex in nature or were not
widely discussed at the time of ratification. Many of the most
hotly contested modern constitutional questions fall into one or
both of these categories.
Originalists can resort to a variety of strategies in order to
address these problems. These include relying on interpretations of the Constitution by knowledgeable elites, focusing on
media accounts, and investigating the possibility that even relatively ignorant voters could grasp the issue in question by relying on information shortcuts. They can also modify their the187. For this type of objection to the use of construction, see McGinnis &
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 1, at 675−79.
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ories by preferring literal to figurative interpretations of constitutional text, and relying more on construction rather than interpretation. Yet each of these approaches has drawbacks.
Even in combination, they may not be able to solve all or even
most of the hard cases that bedevil scholars and judges.
The existence of such insuperable cases need not be a
death blow to original meaning originalism. The methodology
does not have to give us the answer to all difficult constitutional questions in order to be useful. Moreover, its shortcomings
must be weighed against the flaws of rival theories, originalist
and otherwise. Both living constitution theories and alternative
accounts of originalism have weaknesses of their own.
Greater reliance on construction and literal meanings are
not the only possible ways to deal with cases where the original
meaning is indeterminate because of political ignorance. They
may not even be the best. Fuller consideration of the possible
alternatives is a task for another article. There is probably no
single magic bullet that will resolve the dilemma once and for
all. But the beginning of wisdom is to increase our knowledge of
the challenge posed by ignorance.

